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Abstract
We address how regime supporters affect war-making by re-opening a classic debate
on business elites and their influence on states’ conflict behavior. Imperialist theories
contend that business elites encourage executives to undertake military expeditions to
“open up” foreign markets, while “capitalist peace” arguments emphasize that business
elites have economic incentives to work for peace. We synthesize these arguments and
propose that countries become more belligerent, in general, when business elites enter
regime support coalitions, but not towards other business-supported regimes. We use
recently compiled data on social groups in regime support coalitions, covering 200
polities across 1789–2018, to test implications of our argument. We find that business-
supported regimes are more likely to initiate armed conflict, but not against other
countries with business-elite supported regimes. We also find support for additional
implications, for instance pertaining to how the belligerence of business-supported
regimes depends on existing trade relationships.
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tive Politics Workshop.
1
1 Introduction
Decades of research have that domestic political institutions of various kinds affect the inter-
state conflict behavior of states. Domestic constraints on executives, in particular, have been
proposed to explain the war behavior of both democracies (Hegre, 2014) and dictatorships
(Weeks, 2012, 2014).1 Yet, decision-making on war and peace is influenced also by other
domestic political features than structural features pertaining to a country’s institutions.
What types of actors wield power also matters. In this paper, we turn the focus towards who
holds influence within (democratic and autocratic) institutions. More specifically, we explore
how the economic motivations of business elites, and their sway over political leaders, affect
the war behavior of states under different conditions.
History provides several examples suggesting that business elites influence political lead-
ers’ decisions to go to war. For instance, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, vocal
critics suggested that the invasion was motivated by the interests of “Big Oil”, which was
deeply entrenched in the Bush administration.2 Also several 19th century conflicts have been
attributed to the interests and influence of business elites, including the First Opium War
initiated by Britain against China (Greenberg, 1969) and the War of the Pacific – also known
as the “Salpeter War” or “Ten Cents War” – from 1879–1883, pitting Chile against Bolivia
and Peru (Farcau, 2000). Also smaller-scale conflicts such as the “opening” of Japanese
cities to trade by the Perry Expedition in 1854 have been linked to profit motives of business
elites and cooperating governments. Lenin (1999), for example, proposed that politicians
influenced by the interests of capital would initiate armed conflicts to open up new markets
and colonize economically less developed areas. Thus, in order to understand the outbreak
of conflict observers have, throughout history, asked: cui bono? Who profits?
Still, the archetypal image of warmongering business elites contrasts with another widely
held view suggesting that business elites may have strong economic interests to preserve
the peace. In 1910 – in the same decade as Lenin published his theory on Imperialism
– Norman Angell published “The Great Illusion”, arguing that European capitalists had
strong incentives to avoid war, notably due to the profits stemming from peace under condi-
tions of interdependent markets (Angell, 1938). Contemporary conflict scholars refined this
argument, finding systematic empirical evidence for the pacifying effects of, for example,
trade (Russett and Oneal, 2001) and financial integration (Gartzke, 2007). These “capitalist
peace” arguments suggest that business interests, when empowered politically, could have
1For a recent synthesis, see Hyde and Saunders (2020).
2See Vidal (2007). For an alternative explanation of the war Debs and Monteiro (c.f., 2014).
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pacifying effects.
We synthesize these two strands of argument; although reaching different conclusions,
the “imperialist” and “capitalist peace” views share two key features. First, they both rely
on a model of politics whereby state executives somehow react strongly to the preferences
of business actors. Second, both views assume that business elites’ preferences on matters
of war and peace will depend on how they anticipate war to affect their firms’ profits. We
provide a more detailed theoretical account of when and how business elites shape war
behavior, that integrates the two views. In doing so, we propose that the ability of business
elites to influence decisions of war and peace depends on whether or not they are part
of a (autocratic or democratic) regime’s support coalition. This aligns with insights linking
decision-making and policy-outcomes not only to the interests of the principal leader but also
the coalition that s/he relies upon to stay in power (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012; Svolik, 2012; Weeks, 2014; Hyde and Saunders, 2020).
Further, we highlight that the profit-motive of business elites may, especially depending on
the economic situation of the “target country” in question, sometimes be a force for peace
and at other times a force for war.
We test different empirical implications from our argument, and thus offer the first direct
large-n investigation of the link between business elites’ role in regime support coalitions
and interstate conflict behavior. We draw on recently compiled data in version 9 of the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell,
Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Pemstein, Seim,
Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Wilson, Cornell, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Ilchenko, Krusell, Maxwell,
Mechkova, Medzihorsky, Pernes, von Romer, Stepanova, Sundstrom, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig
and Ziblatt, 2019; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Marquardt, Medzihorsky,
Pemstein, Pernes, von Ro¨mer et al., 2019; Pemstein et al., 2018) registering the presence and
status of business elites in regime support coalitions of almost 200 countries, with maximum
time series extending from 1789–2018. We combine these data with measures of milita-
rized interstate disputes from Correlates of War (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010), in a
directed-dyads framework. We thereby augment previous empirical studies of “the capitalist
peace” (see Schneider and Gleditsch, 2010), which have attempted to capture the power
and interests of economic actors by using structural variables, such as trade volume within
dyads (Russett and Oneal, 2001), size of the financial sector (Gartzke, 2007), or how contract
intensive economies are (Mousseau, 2013). While these approaches have offered important
insights, they do not adequately account for the political positions of business elites within a
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regime; in other words, they do not satisfactorily model business elites as actors. Our study
thus responds to Schneider (2017), who recently surveyed the capitalist-peace literature and
recommended that “empirical tests of the proposed causal mechanism should rely on data
sets in which capitalists appear as actors and not as “structures”” (p.1).
In brief, we find that regimes backed by business elites are, generally, more likely to initi-
ate militarized interstate disputes, supporting the belligerent, “imperialist” view of business
elites. But, we also find clear evidence that business-supported regimes are systematically
less likely to initiate disputes against another country where the regime is backed by business
elites, providing support for the capitalist peace thesis. These results hold up to controlling
for standard covariates such as distance between countries and material capabilities and are
fairly robust to alternative specifications. Testing additional implications and scope condi-
tions, we find that the relationship holds both before and after WWI, and that it interacts
with trade relationships, as anticipated: Business-business dyads are much less likely to end
up in conflicts when trade is high in the dyad, and business-supported regimes are more
likely to attack non-business regimes when pre-existing trade is low. These findings offer
new lessons for long-standing discussions on how business interests shape war behavior, how
the proposed pacifying effect of business elites depends on internal power dynamics (i.e., the
extent to which business elites can influence domestic regimes), and considerations about
economic costs and gains from different types of armed conflict.
2 Background
Explanations of war centering on domestic politics have a long tradition (see, e.g., Waltz,
1959; Levy and Thompson, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). Key notions under-
pinning such theories are that executives are motivated by staying in office and that they
– to varying degrees – are responsive to coalitions of societal actors that can have them
removed (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Chances of removal increase when leaders take actions
that displease elites, for example not following up on explicit commitments to respond to
foreign threats of military action, thus incurring “audience costs” (Fearon, 1994), or lose
costly wars. In such cases, actors with the capacity to remove the leader may create ex ante
and ex post costs to military action. Empowered elites and other actors thus constrain the
action space of the executive, and use this power to steer policy in their preferred direction.
Yet, most empirical contributions on leader constraints focus on institutions. Notably,
a prominent explanation for the “democratic peace” maintains that leaders face greater
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institutional constraints in democratic systems (Hegre, 2014; Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell,
2020). These shackles, in turn, make democracies more likely to opt out of costly wars
(especially with other democracies) and settle disputes peacefully (Choi, 2010; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 1999). Variation in institutional constraints placed on leaders have recently
been invoked to explain variation in conflict behavior also among dictatorships (Weeks, 2014,
2012; Colgan and Weeks, 2015); constraints placed on leaders by alternative, power-balancing
institutions, including capable legislatures or dominant regime parties, may influence even
the belligerence of non-democracies. Hyde and Saunders (2020) synthesize arguments across
different regime types, outlining a continuum of “domestic audience constraints” where both
democracies and dictatorships vary in the degree to which leaders are curtailed.
Yet, at the core of these arguments on institutional constraints lie (often implicit) assump-
tions about particular social actors who establish and populate the different constraining in-
stitutions, and have differing preferences from the leader on matters of peace and war. These
actors presumably use their political clout – coming from being part of the regime’s support
coalition and controlling key institutions – to translate private preferences into foreign pol-
icy decisions. In order to better understand states’ conflict behavior, we should explicitly
consider the preferences of the key actors whom leaders depend on to retain power.
Whereas case-evidence (e.g. Fischer, 1967; Clark, 2012) suggests that the identity and
social characteristics of actors embedded in regime support coalitions influence conflict be-
havior, the more general theoretical and large-n empirical studies on interstate war have, so
far, not sufficiently detailed who these constraining actors are, and how they affect conflict
behavior. Instead, the general conflict literature has focused on other features of support
coalitions, notably their size (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004). There are recent exceptions
in the study of war behavior in autocracies, where the identity of elite actors has been
approached indirectly by studying autocracy types and distinguishing between military-,
personalist- and party-based regimes (Weeks, 2008, 2014, 2012; Colgan and Weeks, 2015).
Related studies of democracy and conflict have mostly operated with abstract notions and
distinctions between institutional actors (such as “veto players”; e.g., Choi, 2010), horizontal
and social accountability (Hegre, Bernhard and Teorell, 2020), and vertical constraints from
the broader electorate (Goldsmith et al., 2017; Baum and Potter, 2015). Yet, this literature
remains mute on questions concerning how the more specific social identities and economic
interests of regime supporters influence conflict behavior.
Against this backdrop, we present a theoretical argument considering how the preferences
of members of the regime’s support coalition influence conflict behavior. More specifically,
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we focus on business elites, typically urban investors or owners of large firms. As noted in
the introduction, the role of business elites in international war was hotly debated in earlier
decades, and we draw on these early insights when constructing our argument. Marxist
theories of war, notably including Lenin’s (1999) Imperialist theory implying that capitalist
societies will be more war-prone, was that business elites have much to gain from war. On
Lenin’s view, politicians acting on behalf of the interests of capital would engage in conflicts
to colonize countries, with the purpose of opening up new markets (see also Hobson, 1902;
Luxemburg, 1913). Presumably, competition for colonies would ultimately also lead to wars
between capitalist countries “competing” for such markets. Also Hilferding’s (1985) “theory
of imperialism” suggests that capitalist-supported regimes seek to expand markets by violent
means to increase profits and Galtung’s (1971) “structural theory of imperialism” proposes
that capitalist regimes in the “center” use violent means to subjugate and exploit states in the
“periphery”, to serve their economic interests. Hence, conflict may reflect the advancement
of business interests.
In contrast, other scholars have highlighted the interests of capital in promoting peace
rather than war. Early contributions to “capitalist peace theory” (e.g., Angell, 1938; Schum-
peter, 1955/1919) pointed out the economic costs of war, and several recent contributions
echo these sentiments, emphasizing the costs of interrupting transnational economic inter-
actions. Hence, business elites might incur various costs from war that exceed potential
benefits, notably because war disrupts trade (c.f., Anderton and Carter, 2001; Gowa and
Hicks, 2017). Further, war may lower confidence in markets and thus reduce investments
and increase capital flight (Lensink, Hermes and Murinde, 2000). Further, fighting – espe-
cially on one’s own territory – may destroy key infrastructure and deplete existing stocks of
physical capital. Further, losses in human capital and labor supply from soldiers dying in
battle increase labor costs (e.g., Scheidel, 2018). Thus, war can be “bad for business”.
3 Business elites and conflict
Our argument highlights the various pecuniary incentives of business elites reviewed above,
their ability to influence policy, and leader decisions on war and peace. Hence, our argument
draws on the costs-of-war mechanisms from the capitalist peace tradition,3 and integrate
3Recent arguments have gone beyond addressing direct costs of war, and highlight other mechanisms that
likely also contribute to the “capitalist peace”. Gartzke (2007) proposes that capitalist (open) economies
reveal more information about the intentions of leaders, reducing private information and opportunistic
bluffing that often induce war. Mousseau (2013) proposes that the contractual integration of capitalist
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them with the reviewed gains-from-war mechanisms proposed by Lenin (1999), Galtung
(1971) and others. In short, we detail how profit-motivated business elites weigh the differ-
ent expected costs and revenues of war, preferring war when expected profits are positive
and peace otherwise. Further, we describe how the presence of business elites in the regime’s
support coalition allow these pecuniary interests to translate into policy decisions on initi-
ating or avoiding conflict. While we focus on business elites in this paper, our framework is
flexible and can be specified for any support group where we can outline the expected gains
and costs associated with warfare.
3.1 A simple model of support coalition incentives and war-making
Starting with the conceptual building blocks, we define a ‘political regime’ as the set of rules
that regulate who are chosen as political leaders, and how they are selected into and out
of power (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014; Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020). Such rules
can be formal, for instance embedded in a constitution, but they can also be informal rules
that are practiced and enforced by a broader or narrower group of key actors. A ‘support
group’ is a social group – characterized by class, common profession, or some other politically
salient social marker such as ethnicity or religion – whose manifest or latent support strongly
enhances the regime’s prospects of survival.4 Examples of support groups are party elites in
current Communist China, land-owning elites and the military in early 19th century Prussia,
and a particular ethnic/religious group (the Alawites) in the present Baathist regime in Syria.
The social group that we focus on, which may or may not be a support group for a regime at
a given point in time, is ‘business elites’. We delineate this group to cover owners, managers
and major investors in relatively large enterprises, financiers, and other leaders of industry,
all of which are typically concentrated in urban centers. We exclude from the definition
large-scale land-owners and other rural elites, and treat them as a separate social group in
our empirical study. Similarly, we distinguish “urban middle classes”, including owners of
small enterprises and salaried professionals, from business elites.
We assume that wars are ultimately decided on by executives. Historically, decisions
on war and peace have often been a constitutional prerogative of chief executives. Also in
systems without constitutions, leaders (perhaps together with a small council of advisers)
are, in practice, central in war-making decisions. Yet, even if the ultimate decision lies with
economies is decisive in causing peace.
4A ‘support coalition’ consists of all relevant support groups for the regime, at a particular point in time.
Hence, a support coalition can contain one or several support groups, and one (or a few) support group(s)
may be relatively more important to regime survival than others.
7
the leader, support groups can influence such decisions through different means. They can
pressure the leader ex ante to enter or avoid a war, and punish the leader ex-post should
s/he enter a war that they disagree with or that ends with a bad outcome (c.f Weeks, 2014).
We construe support group power in terms of the “costs” that it can impose on the leader.
These costs could be related to support groups refusing to co-operate if war breaks out
(e.g. withholding loans or taxes), supporting an opponent in the next election, or trying
to remove the leader through orchestrating or bankrolling a coup d’e´tat. Such support-
group imposed costs add to other costs of war (or peace), from the leader’s viewpoint, thus
affecting decision calculuses. In some instances, support groups can influence policy also more
indirectly by formalizing decision-making procedures (e.g. ratification or veto procedures),
by institutionalizing effective monitoring of executive decisions, and by delegating decision-
making power in certain areas (e.g. the financing of wars) to other entities than the executive
branch.
Support groups presumably influence policy according to their private preferences. What
ultimately matters for support group preferences on decisions on peace and war, we assume,
is the difference between the expected gains (E(g)) and losses (E(l)) of a particular conflict.5
When the group considers E(g)−E(l) > 0, it will not attempt to constrain leaders deciding
to go to war, and it may even expend resources to push for conflict, in proportion to the
expected gains. If E(g)− E(l) < 0, the group will try to prevent a war.
In this simplified scheme, we can construe “gains” and “losses” broadly to include both
monetary and non-pecuniary factors. For instance, if industrial workers are enlisted in
armies and sent off to battle, a high body count represents a high non-pecuniary cost to
this group. Likewise, increased prestige or political influence after a (successful) war may
be a relevant non-pecuniary expected gain for military officers. In our discussion of business
elites, however, we simplify and focus exclusively on monetary costs, for different kinds of
warfare, thus following core assumptions in both the “capitalist peace” and “imperialist”
literatures: Business owners maximize expected profits, E(pi) = E(r)− E(c), where E(r) is
expected revenue and E(c) is expected monetary costs. If initiating a war increases expected
profits, business elites presumably favor it, or favor actions that heighten the risk of war such
as threats.
5Expected gains and costs are aggregated over the probability distributions that actors have over the
potential outcomes that can follow from war. This framework could easily be extended to incorporate risk
aversion – i.e., actors would willingly pay a premium to avoid the worst outcomes. Yet, we simplify and
discuss as if actors are risk neutral.
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3.2 The incentives of business elites
Standard microeconomic theory (see, e.g., Varian, 1992) can help us to understand how
profit-maximizing business elites view wars under different scenarios. Let us list some rel-
evant insights for our purposes: First, a monopoly situation yields strictly higher revenue
(and thus profit) than an oligopoly situation (two or a few competing firms), which, in turn,
gives higher revenue than a “free-market” situation with numerous competing firms. Sec-
ond, neoclassical trade theory suggests that even in industries with constant or decreasing
returns to scale, i.e., marginal costs are constant or increase in produced units, opening
up to international trade benefits capital owners from capital-intensive countries. Third,
when there are increasing returns to scale in production, firms from both capital-intensive
and labor-intensive countries may reap higher profits from accessing larger markets, due to
falling marginal costs with higher production volumes. Fourth, “gravity models” of trade
(e.g., Feenstra, 2003) posit that trade volumes are generally higher between geographically
close economies. Regarding foreign investments, micro-economic theory predicts that capital
investments in initially capital-scarce markets (typically poor economies) yield higher returns
to investment. Further, prominent theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) suggest that
businesses often have strong incentives to locate parts of their operations in countries with
“location-specific advantages” (Dunning, 1993), including abundant natural resources.
Against this background, let us reconsider the long-standing “imperialist argument” on
business elites and war. Lenin (1999), for example, suggests that business elites consider
warfare as a profitable means to expand markets and acquire high rents on capital invested
in new locations that are not (yet) fully integrated in global markets (see also Hobsbawm,
2010a,b). Under these conditions, the above-listed insights from economic theory do, indeed,
suggest that business elites can gain from war through various pathways.
First, military coercion can be used to give (initiator-country) business elites market
access, thus increasing expected profits (E(pi)). State can use military force short of invasion
to intimidate a “closed economy” to open up its markets to imports (increasing E(r)) or give
initiator-country companies control over key inputs to production through foreign ownership
or forced exports (reducing E(c))). The “Gunboat Diplomacy” practiced by the British
during the First Opium War (Wong, 2000), when Britain forced China to set tariffs at
5% and open several ports to foreign trade, is one example. Actions can also take the
form of outright invasion, sometimes followed by colonization, whereafter invading-country
companies are given market access or ownership of key assets.6
6Historically, some companies have even taken a direct role in military campaigns and colonial man-
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Second, once a market is “opened”, military intervention may be required to maintain
trade and safeguard foreign investments (for several 19th century examples of British inter-
vention motivated by such goals, see Lipson, 1985). The 1902-03 blockade of Venezuela by
major European powers is illustrative. Venezuela had just emerged from a costly civil war
and had accrued foreign debts on infrastructure investments – for example, German Krupp
had built the great Venezuelan Railway – which the new regime under Cipriano Castro re-
fused to honor. After Venezuela refuted diplomatic overtures, German and British naval
forces implemented a blockade. The conflict ended with an agreement where Venezuelan
custom duties would pay off foreign debts, with preferential treatment afforded debts from
the blockade-initiating countries.
Third, business elites may sometimes even increase E(r), and reap excessive profits, from
supplying weapons or other inputs needed for the war effort. One well-known example is the
fortunes of major German industrial companies such as Krupp (Manchester, 2017).
Fourth, direct losses from war can sometimes be relatively low for business elites, es-
pecially for wars fought far from the country’s territory with low risk of factories or vital
infrastructure being destroyed. Business elites are unlikely to be engaged in direct combat,
as other groups such as peasants (in rural 19th century economies) or industrial workers (in
urban 19th century economies) have populated armies. This reflects the assumption that,
for business elites, expected losses mainly consists of monetary costs. The absence of large
non-pecuniary costs makes it more likely that expected gains exceed expected costs.
In sum, business elites likely profit from certain international wars, giving them an in-
centive to push – or at least not constrain – leaders to initiate militarized disputes. Given
the insights from economic theory, we expect such incentives to be stronger for business
elites in capital-intensive countries and in countries with large-scale businesses engaging in
increasing-returns-to-scale production. Also, the more capital scarce (higher rents), the more
populous (larger export market), and the more natural-resource rich (lower production costs)
the potential “target country” is, the stronger are the incentives to attack. Further, busi-
ness elites will have strong incentives to wage wars that lead to or maintain colonization of
agement. The British East India Company was present in India from the 17th century, and pressured the
British government, through the East Indian lobby, to further its interests. In 1757, the company defeated
the Nawad of Bengal Siraj-ud-Daula at Plassey, installed Mir Jafar as a puppet ruler, and procured the
right to extract revenue in 1765. From its center in (opium-producing) Bengal, and with an 115,000 man
strong army, the company enforced monopsony power against Indian competitors and financed its trade with
China (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007). During 1813-1820, Lord Governor of Bengal, Lord Moria, expanded
the company’s control by defeating the Gurkhas of Nepal and destroying the Maratha Empire. The company
retained a monopoly of trade to 1833.
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an area, if this supports the monopoly situation of home-country companies. If revenues
are very high, business elites may even have incentives to angle for war against potential
“competitor” countries to prevent their businesses from “taking” shares from profitable for-
eign markets (following the notion of monopolistic capitalism causing geo-political conflict
in Lenin, 1999).
Yet, this is only part of the picture. Wars may reduce E(r) and affect E(c) through
various other channels, as highlighted by the above-reviewed “capitalist peace” arguments.7
Such accounts predict that business elites are averse to war when profits depend on existing
economic networks that create interdependence through foreign trade and investments. War
may interrupt such networks. Hence, business elites reliant on international trade should be
averse to wars with countries that are already major trading partners (Russett and Oneal,
2001).8 Insofar as war interrupts trade between warring parties (Anderton and Carter,
2001), costs include reduced imports of key inputs to production (increasing E(c)) and
reduced exports (reducing E(r)). War might also put any foreign investments in the opposing
country at risk of destruction or expropriation. Hence, business elites may have incentives
to constrain leaders from starting wars, especially wars against countries that disrupt major
trade flows or put existing foreign investments at risk.
In sum, we have considered two seemingly contrasting perspectives on how business elites,
when they have political leverage, will influence the likelihood of international conflict. The
“imperialist perspective” emphasizes the benefits to business elites from warfare, whereas
the “capitalist peace” perspective emphasizes that warfare may hurt business. Still, these
perspectives highlight very different types of changes to the costs and revenues of domestic
businesses, which are likely to be more/less prevalent depending on contextual factors.
One key contextual factor is whether the target state is already integrated in the world
economy, or is signaling willingness that it will integrate in the near future. If so, business
elites in potential initiator states are more likely to conduct trade or have investments in the
target state, thereby increasing the relevance of the pacifying capitalist peace mechanisms.
This scenario, we surmise, is more likely if the target state’s regime is (also) supported by
business elites, and in particular where the target and the initiator are already major trading
7In addition, large-scale warfare increases wages by diverting workers to the war effort and squeezing
labor supply. Wars are also costly for the state, and need to be financed, partly through taxes. Yet, while
taxes (on business) may increase with interstate conflict many wars have, historically, been financed through
loans and issuing of government bonds.
8Business elites could even disfavor war more generally since it creates uncertainty and market slowdowns
that hurts business and trade across the board. On this account, elites whose profits rely on financial markets
should be averse to war (Gartzke, Nordstrom and Boehmer, 2011).
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partners. Notably, if business elites are not part of the support coalitions, and countries are
major trading partners, the economic costs of war may be less important for the political
decision-making calculus. Since we assume that business elites are mainly interested in
maximizing expected profits, and will use any political leverage that they may have to
further this end, whether business elites are agents of war or peace will likely depend on
whether the potential target state’s regime is supported by business elites and whether it is
already a major trading partner.
We bring the following empirical implications to the data:
First, we test the hypothesis that regimes supported by business elites are, overall, more
likely to initiate a conflict than regimes without business elites in the support coalition.
This expectation stems from the multiple possible targets where business elites can expand
markets and expropriate foreign resources during the 1789–2018 time-span under study.
Second, we anticipate a very different relationship when potential target states are “busi-
ness friendly” and already engage in, or signal that they will engage in, international trade
and investment. Domestic business elites should have weaker incentives to pick fights with
like-minded trading states than with closed economies. Specifically, we expect that regimes
supported by business elites are less inclined to fight other regimes supported by business
elites.
We also test an implication concerning conditional effects discussed above: The pacifying
effect of belonging to a business–business dyad should be more pronounced in dyads with
high pre-existing levels of trade. We expand on this additional implication, as well as possible
scope conditions of the argument pertaining to, e.g., historical period under study, after our
main tests.
4 Data and research design
We present and discuss the data and operationalization, first, for our key independent vari-
able and, second, for our dependent variable. Thereafter, we introduce the control variables
and benchmark specification.
4.1 Regime support groups
While previous contributions have used structural factors to proxy for the economic prefer-
ences of regimes and their supporters (see Schneider, 2017), we employ new data on regime
support groups (see Knutsen et al., 2019) that allow us to more directly capture whether or
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not business elites are important political actors. These data, which are embedded in v.9
of the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard,
Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning,
Staton, Wilson, Cornell, Gastaldi, Gjerlow, Ilchenko, Krusell, Maxwell, Mechkova, Medzi-
horsky, Pernes, von Romer, Stepanova, Sundstrom, Tzelgov, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt, 2019),
cover almost 200 countries with maximum time series running from 1789–2018 and modal
time series from 1900–2018. Our measures on regime support groups are coded by country
experts, mostly political historians, political scientists or other social scientists who have
studied the political system of the country in question (for details on expert recruitment and
methodology, see Knutsen et al., 2019; Coppedge et al., 2020).
The experts were presented with a 14-category scheme of potential support groups. In
addition to business elites, the scheme includes other socio-economic groups such as Agrarian
elites, Urban middle classes, and Industrial workers, and key groups characterized by their
place in the traditional social hierarchy or state apparatus, including The aristocracy, Party
elites, and The military. This scheme is used for a multiple selection variable and a single-
selection variable (most important group). The multiple-selection version reads: “Which
groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power?”, where groups
to be coded are “supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would
substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power”. To ensure consistency
in the understanding of the ‘regime’ concept and the particular regimes’ identities, all experts
were presented with detailed concept clarification plus pre-coded dates and name of each
regime (see Djuve, Knutsen and Wig, 2020). Experts could then code support groups as
time-varying features, also within regimes, down to the date level.
Our main measure is a dummy scored 1 for regimes that are supported by business
elites, and 0 otherwise. This dummy draws on the multiple selection question on support
groups. (We use the most important group question for robustness tests). Multiple experts
code support groups for each country-year, and the original V-Dem variable is continuous,
taking the mean of the experts’ scores for presence (1) or absence (0) of business elites
in the coalition. For our main measure, we require that half or more of all experts, for a
given country-year, agree that business elites are a support group to code it as a “business-
supported regime”. That is, our main dummy measure is scored 1 if the continuous, original
V-Dem measure is ≥ 0.5 and 0 if the original measure is < 0.5.
Requiring that half of the expert coders agree on business elites being part of the support
coalition sets a fairly high threshold. Yet, it also allows for the coding of a business regime
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even if, say, one deviant expert coder out of four has a different understanding of the historical
record. This should increase reliability relative to a very strict threshold requiring that all
experts should agree for coding the regime as a business-supported regime. Still, we do test
such a restrictive measure, and our main results are robust. We also run models with the
original, continuous V-Dem measure, which allow us to distinguish situations where business
elites are clearly not part of the support coalition from cases where this is more unclear
even to country experts (which could indicate that the group has some influence over the
regime). Further, we test specifications where we normalize business group participation by
the total number of groups in the support coalition to account for less influence in larger
coalitions. The count of support groups is done by aggregating across similar dummies as the
one constructed for business elites, for all 14 group categories. We note that while business
elites is a fairly common support group, it is not among the most common ones in our
samples. Rather, military, party elites and foreign governments have been the three most
common support groups, globally, during the past 200 years.
Figure 1 illustrates that there is ample historical variation in business elites’ inclusion in
support coalitions. The figure shows the share of countries in which business elites partic-
ipated in the regime support coalition in a given year. The participation of business elites
increased quite rapidly from the mid-1800s to 1900. The marked drop in 1900 reflects that
the sample of countries covered in V-Dem increases in 1900, notably with the inclusion of
numerous African and Asian colonies. Thus, this drop is driven by the new polities entering
the sample less often having business elites in the support coalition. Further, the share of
countries with business elites in the support coalition declined during the early 20th century,
but after WWII it has increased steadily. In 2018, more than half of all support coalitions
included business elites.
Figure 2 shows how the historical development in business-supported regimes has varied
across geographical regions. For instance, the share of regimes supported by business elites
increased rapidly in Western Europe and North America during the 1800s, but has been
more stable during the 1900s. Eastern Europe had a very low share of business-supported
regimes for most of modern history, but this changed after the dissolution of the Soviet
Empire. In Latin America and the Caribbean, regimes supported by business elites have
been relatively common in both the 19th and 20th centuries, and this is currently the region
with the highest share of business-supported regimes. The share of regimes supported by
business elites has been and is still comparatively low in MENA and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Business elites’ involvement in regimes also varies within countries over time, as illustrated
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Figure 1: Business elites in regime coalitions, globally. 1789-2018
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by Figure 3, which shows the historical development in a selection of countries.
4.2 Conflict
For our main dependent variable, we use data on onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes
(MID) that yields at least one casualty, drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) project
(Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). MIDs are operationalized as “conflicts in which one or more
states threaten, display, or use force against one or more other states”.9 The main reason
for analyzing MIDs rather than full-blown interstate wars – conflict incidents between states
that reach a 1000-casualty threshold – is that a MIDs-based measure captures additional,
theoretically important information. As our argument and empirical illustrations make clear,
we are theoretically interested in hostile actions that often stop short of full-blown wars, such
as “gunboat diplomacy” against weak opponents. Indeed, MIDs are events that come from
actions that ex ante carried a risk of escalating to war; escalation to full-blown wars will often
result from bargaining failures and random factors that are in “the error term” (Gartzke,
1999), and war is not necessarily a premeditated outcome (see also Braumoeller, 2019). Since
our argument focuses on ex ante derived expected costs and gains of conflict, there is a clear
theoretical relevance of capturing the initiation of interstate conflicts, even if these, ex post,
turn out not to give numerous casualties (e.g. because the target is quickly defeated or
9See http : //cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data− sets/MIDs.
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Figure 2: Business elites in regime coalitions, by regions. 1789-2018
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backed down when facing credible displays of force). Finally, there are many more MIDs
than full-blown wars, and the additional variation means that we obtain much more efficient
estimates, and can conduct more stringent control strategies and analysis of theoretically
relevant sub-samples, when using MIDs.
4.3 Empirical specification and core control variables
From our theoretical argument, we derived both monadic expectations – on business elites in
the support coalition in the potential conflict-initiating country i increasing overall conflict
risk – and dyadic ones – concerning the pacifying effect of simultaneously having business
elites in the support coalitions in country i and the potential target country j. Given the
dyadic expectation, and since our theoretical argument relates to incentives for initiating
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Figure 3: Business elites in regime coalitions, selected countries. 1789-2018
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A regime is considered as having business elites in its support coalition if the original measures from V-Dem on social groups’ inclusion in support
coalitions is coded as above or equal to 0.5. This corresponds to half or more of all experts agree that a certain social group is included in a
support coalition.
conflict, we test our hypothesis on directed dyads where the outcome is MID-initiation (see
Reiter and Stam, 2003). A directed dyad is a country-pair, i and j, where i is a potential
initiator and j a potential target. All countries appear as both i and j; for each dyad,
there are two directed dyads. If country i starts a conflict with country j, we register “1”
in the directed dyad i − j, but 0 in j − i. Each variable that is measured for the initiator
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(target) appears with the subscript i (j). The unit of analysis is thus directed dyad-years,
and we estimate logit models capturing the risk of initiating a fatal MID in a given year,
with standard errors clustered on dyads.
One key challenge is that several confounders could drive selection both into the category
of “business-elite regimes” and affect conflict behavior. Absent relevant natural experiments,
we mainly employ a selection-on-observables strategy where we account for different observ-
able factors that could influence both likelihood of having business elites in the support
coalition and conflict initiation. Our benchmark logit regressions therefore includes several
covariates, most of which are typical controls from the interstate conflict literature, measured
separately for countries i and j. First, we include GDP per capita and population. Both
variables are log-transformed, and we use the extensive time series with imputed estimates
from Fariss et al. (2017). The authors arrive at these imputed estimates via a dynamic
latent trait model run on various GDP and population datasets, and we use their estimates
benchmarked in the Maddison project time series (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013). Second, we
account for states’ material capabilities, measured as CINC scores from COW; economically
developed and powerful countries may more often have business-elites as part of their sup-
port coalition. At the dyad-level, we include contiguity (i.e., shared border) and distance
between the two countries. Neighboring and proximate countries may, for various reasons,
be more likely to have similar support coalitions and rates of conflict.
Our benchmark also includes linear, squared, and cubed terms for peace years in the
dyad to capture conflict history. While we would have liked to include year- and dyad-fixed
effects in all models to more fully safeguard against omitted confounders, there is simply
not enough variation in the data to support the inclusion of such dummies simultaneously.
We do estimate some models with dyad-fixed effects, and adding these dummies reduce our
effective N to less than 15% of our original sample (on the issue of country-/dyad-fixed effects
and reduced efficiency in IR research, see Beck and Katz, 2001). Thus, we rather include
region- and decade-fixed effects in our benchmark to ensure relatively efficient estimation
while capture temporally stable geographic confounders and any time trends.
In some models, we also control for dyadic democracy to account for our results poten-
tially reflecting a “democratic peace” effect; democracies could be more likely to include
business elites in their support coalitions and are less likely to fight each other. We use V-
Dem’s Polyarchy measure of electoral democracy (Teorell et al., 2019), and follow standard
practice in the democratic peace literature by measuring only the lowest democracy score in
the dyad (see Goertz, 2006). Yet, we leave this control out of our benchmark; certain social
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groups, such as urban middle classes (Moore, 1966) or industrial workers (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens, 1992), are likely to influence the regime in a more democratic direc-
tion if they partake in support coalitions, for instance by demanding stronger civil liberties
protection or franchise extensions. Thus, controlling for democracy could be very well yield
post-treatment bias when investigating the effect of a particular support group such as busi-
ness elites.
In yet other specifications, we control for numerous additional factors, including measures
of state capacity and other institutional features, to assess robustness. These additional tests
are detailed below.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Main results
Table 1 displays our benchmark results, pertaining to our two main expectations. Model 1.1
estimates a logit model of MID initiation with errors clustered on dyads, region- and decade-
fixed effects, but only including the benchmark covariates that we believe are most likely to
be “pre-treatment”, namely material capabilities, GDP per capita, population, distance, and
contiguity. All covariates are lagged by 1 year and non-dyadic variables (e.g., population)
are measured both for the potential initiator and target. Model 1.2 adds covariates that
might confound the relationship, but could also plausibly be post-treatment. These are V-
Dem’s measures of size of the support coalitions and the number of groups in the coalitions
(both for initiators and targets), and joint (dyadic) democracy. Regardless of whether we
add these potential post-treatment covariates, we find the expected relationships. Business-
supported regimes appear more likely to initiate conflict, everything else equal, but the
estimated interaction term suggests that they are less likely to do so against other business-
elite regimes. Notably, results from Model 1.2 suggest that these patterns are not driven by
business elites having different probabilities of entering the support coalition in more and
less democratic regimes or in larger or smaller support coalitions, as we control for these
features in Model 1.2. Taken together, these results provide preliminary evidence for our
argument.
To facilitate interpretation, we calculate the predicted probabilities of fatal MID initiation
under different scenarios, drawing on the estimates from Model 1.2. Figure 4 shows predicted
risks of MID initiation in a given year, when all other covariates are kept at their mean values,
both for regimes with (businessi =1) and without (businessi =0) business elites in the support
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Table 1: Directed dyadic logit models of fatal MID initiation: Evaluating the role of business
elites
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Measure Presence in coalition Relative share
Business elites i 0.361*** 0.413*** 7.229*** 8.243***
(3.35) (3.50) (4.32) (4.53)
Business elites i 0.420*** 0.418** 8.933*** 9.417***
(3.62) (3.27) (5.33) (5.10)
Business elites (dyad) -0.498** -0.462** -125.1*** -119.2***
(-3.03) (-2.88) (-3.81) (-3.77)
Ln GDPi 0.158** 0.182** 0.133* 0.148*
(2.83) (3.08) (2.35) (2.53)
Ln GDPj 0.158** 0.232*** 0.129* 0.194***
(3.01) (3.93) (2.53) (3.42)
Ln Popi 0.171** 0.146* 0.193*** 0.175**
(3.00) (2.44) (3.37) (2.92)
Ln Popj 0.0799 0.0145 0.102 0.0435
(1.43) (0.24) (1.82) (0.72)
CINCi 4.977*** 4.648*** 5.178*** 4.922***
(4.65) (4.18) (4.82) (4.36)
CINCj 2.302 1.663 2.511* 1.932
(1.85) (1.32) (2.01) (1.52)
Contiguity -0.0437 -0.0200 -0.0266 -0.00331
(-0.31) (-0.15) (-0.20) (-0.03)
Ln distance -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.164***
(-3.54) (-3.99) (-3.97) (-4.46)
Joint democracy (dyad) -1.336*** -1.378***
(-5.23) (-5.39)
Groups in coalitioni -0.0000475 -0.0273
(-0.00) (-0.36)
Groups in coalitionj 0.0773 0.0175
(1.14) (0.25)
Size of support coalitioni 0.000359 0.00665
(0.01) (0.14)
Size of support coalitionj -0.0203 -0.0145
(-0.49) (-0.35)
Region-dummies X X X X
Decade-dummies X X X X
Duration terms X X X X
N 1,080,286 1,037,428 1,092,232 1,049,278
T statistics in parentheses. Logit regressions with standard errors clustered on dyads.
Dependent variable is MID initiation. Intercept omitted from table.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of initiating fatal MID for different values of Business elitesi,
conditional on whether Business elitesj=0 (left panel) or Business elitesj=1 (right panel).
Estimates are based on Model 1.2, and all other covariates are at their means.
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coalition. We also consider situations when the potential target does (businessj =1; right
panel) and does not have (businessj =0; left panel) business elites in the support coalition.
Business-supported regimes are considerably more likely to initiate MIDs than “non-business
regimes” when the target country’s regime is not supported by business elites; a non-business
initiator has a .0015 probability of starting a conflict against a non-business target, while the
corresponding number is .0026 when the initiator is a business-supported regime. The low
estimated probabilities mainly reflect the rarity of conflict and the dyad-year data structure.
Back-of-the envelope aggregations provide a better illustration of the results’ substantive
magnitude: In a world with 50 potential non-business targets (the number in 1913), there is
a 13% probability that a business-supported regime will initiate at least one conflict against
non-business targets in a year. If both regimes were non-business regimes, the corresponding
risk is 7%. This pattern supports our first expectation on the belligerence of business elites
when conflict is anticipated to be profitable.
In sharp contrast, business-supported regimes are relatively less likely than non-business
regimes to initiate conflicts against targets supported by business regimes. This follows our
second expectation on business elites having pacific incentives once conflicts hurt existing
trade relationships and foreign investments. For business-supported targets, the risk of
a business-supported regime initiating conflict in a year is below .001, about half of the
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probability of a non-business regimes initiating conflict against a business target. According
to these results, business–business dyads are the most peaceful ones, and a business regime
is more than three times as likely to initiate conflict with a non-business regime than with
another business-regime.
5.2 Robustness tests
We conducted various robustness tests to assess the sensitivity of our results to different
measurement, sample, and model specification choices. We start by assessing sensitivity to
how we measure business elite involvement in the support coalition. The rightmost columns
in Table 1 replicate the benchmark specifications, but employ the discussed relative-share
version of the measures. To recapitulate, these measures divide the business elite dummy
used in the above analysis by the number of groups that partook in the support coalition
that year, both for i and j. The results suggest that when business groups play a more
prominent role in the support coalition, a country is more likely to attack countries where
business groups play a lesser role, and less likely to attack countries where business elites
play a larger role. In Appendix Table A.5, we show that our main results are robust to
using the original, continuous, version of the business support group measure, which is,
e.g., scored 0.75 if three of four country-experts rate business elites as part of the support
coalition. Results for the monadic expectation on business-supported regimes being more
belligerent are also robust to using a stricter scoring of the dummy variable on support group
presence, requiring that all V-Dem experts agree that business elites were in coalition that
year. However, results for the dyadic expectation on more pacific business-business dyads
are less clear when using this measure. Finally, we probed V-Dem’s ‘most important support
group’ measure, only capturing cases where a plurality of experts coders consider business
elites to be the most important group in the support coalition. The first expectation on
belligerent business elites is once again supported, while results are weaker for the second
expectation on pacific business-business dyads.
Next, we tested sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of particular observations. More
specifically, we exclude WWI and WWII, by dropping the years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945
from the dataset, and re-estimate our core models. We do so to ensure that results do
not hinge on these historically unique conflicts involving multiple countries linked through
alliances. Our results remain similar when excluding these cases (see Table A.2).
The results above offer at least two interpretations; they could reflect causal processes
tying regime-support group identity to conflict, or they could stem from omitted factors that
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condition both identity and conflict. We have no surefire way to clearly adjudicate between
these two interpretations. Still, we conduct several additional tests to further assess the
plausibility of a causal interpretation of the results, in line with our argument.
First, we conduct the perhaps most demanding test by controlling for dyad-fixed effects.
Accounting for such effects on conflict means controlling for all confounders that are relatively
time-invariant and pertain to particular initiator and target countries, and to their bilateral
relationship. This test is demanding in the sense that it likely yields large standard errors
and related likelihood of conducting Type II errors, given the limited number of conflicts
and relevant variation in the data (despite our long time series). Nonetheless, we estimated
a version of the logit model 1.2, but with dyad-fixed effects (Table A.1). When doing so, we
lose more than 90% of our observations, due to no over-time variation in support groups and
conflict. We also estimated a linear probability (OLS) model with dyad-fixed effects, which
keeps the observations pruned by the logit-FE model. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the models
with dyad-fixed effects yield weaker results. For example, the main terms for business elites
are insignificant, and even change signs. Hence, the support for our first expectation is not
completely robust, despite the strong relationship in the models without dyad-fixed effects.
Nonetheless, the interaction term remains sizeable and highly significant even when adding
dyad-fixed effects, suggesting that dyads become more peaceful once they obtain business
elites in the support coalition of both countries’ regimes. Moreover, the three business-terms
are jointly significant in the different dyad-fixed effects models.
Next, we perform sensitivity analyses where we use information about selection on ob-
servable factors – i.e., we gauge how much estimates change when we include the measured
confounders – as a guide to potential selection on unobservables. Specifically, we use the
framework and software developed in Oster (2019), which adjusts the estimated coefficient
under different scenarios of potential omitted variable bias. Several parameters are used
to construct different scenarios. First, we make assumptions about the proportionality of
selection on observables and unobservables. If we assume that unobservables (in a hypo-
thetical scenario) move the coefficient as much as the (inclusion of) observables, then we
have proportional selection, parametrized by δ = 1. Second, we make assumptions about
the explained variance (in the treatment and outcome) that the unobservables can account
for. We follow convention and parametrize this variance in terms of factors of the explained
variance (e.g., twice the size of R2) of the model with covariates. Given these assumptions,
we can calculate the adjusted treatment effect under different omitted-variable scenarios. If
our main result is retained in plausible scenarios, this should strengthen the belief that our
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Table 2: Sensitivity to omitted confounders
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
Benchmark controls Additional controls
R2 from the unobserved confounder .04 .10 .20 .04 .10 .20
Business elitesi .2048*** 1.256*** 3.011*** .0657*** .637*** 1.596***
(.040) .173 .457 (.013) .059 (.130)
Business elitesj .188*** 1.149*** 2.75*** .078*** .783*** 1.96***
(.031) (.15) (.324) (.0198) (.080) (.184)
Business elites (dyad) -.352** -2.006*** -4.767*** -.332 -3.529 -8.861***
(.051) (.250) (.645) (.246) (1.836) (3.214)
N 1,049,278 1,049,278 1,049,278 832,122 832,122 832,122
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T statistics in parentheses. Linear Probability Models. Bootstrapped stan-
dard errors (100 iterations). Intercept and covariates omitted from table. All models assume proportional selection. Models
2.1-2.3 include all covariates from Model 1.2, Table 1. Models 2.4-2.6 add the following covariates: Alliance membership,
IGO membership, foreign policy similarity, state fiscal capacity, remuneration of bureaucrats, state sovereignty over terri-
tory, judicial constraints on executive index, civil society participation index, women’s empowerment index, and physical
violence index.
main results can be given a causal interpretation.
Table 2 evaluates three different omitted-variable scenarios for two sets of models.10 These
omitted variable scenarios assume proportional selection and omitted confounders explain-
ing 2-10 times the variance (R2) explained by our model. The first set of models include all
our benchmark controls from Table 1. The second set add covariates to increase information
about selection on observables, including alliance membership (from COW) and membership
of similar IGO’s and foreign policy preference similarity, using the tau measure Signorino
and Ritter (1999). Further, we add covariates from V-Dem capturing various institutional
aspects that could correlate with business-elite presence in the support coalition and in-
fluence conflict behavior. Three variables capture aspects of state capacity, namely state
fiscal capacity, remuneration of bureaucrats, and state sovereignty over territory. We also
include V-Dem’s judicial constraints on the executive index, civil society participation index,
women’s empowerment index, and physical violence index (capturing internal repression and
civil strife). We add these measures for both i and j, yielding 14 new covariates from V-
Dem. Altogether, the new covariates account for a host of international-political, foreign
policy and domestic-institutional features that may confound the relationship of interest.
Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients for business elites actually turn stronger
as we simulate an omitted confounder (vector) that explains more of the variance than the
current model, assuming that selection from unobservables is proportional to selection from
observables. This assumption seems plausible in light of results being similar when we add all
10These are linear probability (OLS) models, since there is no option for logit models in the software
package. This should presumably not systematically affect the inferences we draw, which are primarily
about the differences in coefficients between different control-variable sets.
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the new confounders that were not included in the original analysis: They produce selection
in the same direction as the selection induced by our baseline controls, suggesting that the
main selection bias issues with our business elite measures are ones that actually make our
results stronger once corrected for. Our main result therefore seems quite robust to omitting
relevant variables.
5.3 Additional implications and scope conditions
We also conducted several tests that address additional implications and potential scope
conditions of our argument. Some of these tests are reported in Table 3, and others in the
appendix. First, we split our sample between the pre- and post-WWI eras. Several historical
examples that we discussed above, such as the ones on gunboat diplomacy, come from the
19th and early 20th centuries. Hence, we suspected that our results might only hold for this
period. However, when rerunning our benchmark on the pre- (Model 3.1) and post-1919
period (3.2), results are actually stronger in the post-1919 era. Notably, coefficient precision
is higher in the later period, which probably reflects the increased number of countries and
MIDs in the post-WWI era.
In Appendix Table A.4, we also test whether the discussed patterns depend on the major-
minor power status of the countries in the dyad. We use COW data for identifying major and
minor powers, and split the sample between major-major, major-minor, minor-major, and
minor-minor dyads. This analysis reveals that our results, both concerning the belligerent
effect of having business elites in the support coalition and the pacifying effect of business-
business dyads, are strongest when both the initiator and target are major powers. However,
we also find strong indications of the first expectation (belligerent business elites) when the
initiator is a major power and the target a minor power. Having business elites in the support
coalition seems to drive the conflict behavior of major powers. We do not find support for
our expectations when the initiator is a minor power.
Next, we consider the role of trade, operationalized as the log of total imports and exports
(measured in USD, using the “smoothed” version from Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins, 2009))
in the dyad. We expect to observe stronger pacifying effects, especially for business-business
pairings, in dyads where trade is high, since high levels of trade should be in the (general)
interests of most business elites and could be disrupted by armed conflict. Since our main
business-business term is an interaction, we investigate this by splitting the sample on high
and low trade, before estimating the core model on these split samples. We split on median
level of total trade, classifying trade flows above (below) the median as “high” (“low”).
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Table 3: Directed dyadic logit models of fatal MID initiation: Evaluating the scope conditions
and additional implications
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5)
Alteration Pre-1919 Post-1919 Above median trade Below median trade Other group controls
Business elites i 0.742*** 0.221 0.434*** 0.176 0.307*
(3.81) (1.73) (3.88) (0.63) (2.57)
Business elites i 0.333 0.541*** 0.440*** 0.689** 0.446***
(1.55) (4.16) (3.56) (3.16) (3.79)
Business elites (dyad) -0.590* -0.478* -0.426* -0.526 -0.414*
(-2.33) (-2.47) (-2.51) (-1.28) (-2.53)
Agrarian elites -0.0221
(-0.18)
Aristocracy -0.0998
(-0.67)
Party elites -0.0990
(-0.73)
Bureaucracy -0.106
(-0.75)
Military 0.103
(0.80)
Ethnic group 0.303
(1.61)
Religious group 0.199
(1.12)
Local elites -0.252
(-1.56)
Industrial workers -0.799***
(-4.06)
Urban middle class 0.181
(1.22)
Rural workers 0.532**
(3.13)
Rural middle class 0.135
(0.71)
Benchmmark controls X X X X X
Region-dummies X X X X X
Decade-dummies X X X X X
N 103,395 962,818 708,608 360,512 1,069,416
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on
dyads. Intercept and baseline covariates omitted from table. Each model includes controls from Model 1.2, Table 1.
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Figure 5: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi conditional on Business elitesj, in high-
trade dyads
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Figure 6: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi conditional on Business elitesj, in low-
trade dyads
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Marginal effect results are presented in Figures 5 and 6. In dyads with high trade (Figure
5), the business-business interaction on conflict is strongly negative, and precisely estimated,
while it is much weaker for low-trade dyads (Figure 6). Business-supported regimes seem
much less likely to fight other business-supported regimes when trade levels are high than
when trade levels are low. However, and less in conformance with our expectations, we find
a stronger effect of business regimes initiating conflict against non-business target countries
when trade levels are high. These split sample results are more or less replicated when we
consider exports or imports separately (Appendix A.3), rather than total trade.
Finally, Model 3.5, Table 3 reports a specification where we control for the presence
of other groups in the regime’s support coalition. The presence of business elites could be
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highly correlated with presence or absence of other particular groups, such as the aristocracy
or urban middle classes, and these other groups may be driving conflict behavior rather than
business elites. We thus control for presence of all other coded support groups in the initiator
country. Our main results for business elites are not significantly altered by including these
controls. There are interesting patterns also for other support groups. Notably, the presence
of industrial workers in the support coalition significantly reduces the likelihood of conflict
initiation. There are many potential reasons for this. For example, workers often bear the
brunt of the casualties (in mass armies) of modern wars, and thus have strong incentives
to avoid armed conflict. However, we leave it for future research to theorize and probe this
empirical relationship more thoroughly.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a framework for linking regime support group identity to
international conflict behavior. More specifically, we synthesized classic “imperialist” and
“capitalist peace” accounts that indicate various links between business elites and conflict
behavior, and present a comprehensive argument on the context-dependent conflict prefer-
ences of business elites, and their consequent impact on conflict behavior when these elites
enter regime support coalitions.
Empirically, we tested different expectations from this argument by linking a novel dataset
on the social-group composition of support coalitions to conventional statistical models of
conflict initiation from the IR literature. Given the comprehensive nature of our argument,
our results speak to different theories of peace and war. First, some of our results corroborate
the “capitalist peace” thesis, as regimes supported by business elites are less inclined to ini-
tiate militarized interstate disputes against other countries governed by business-supported
regimes. The capitalist peace thesis would suggest that this relationship is due to the in-
terdependent nature of the economic interests of these business elites residing in different
countries. Indeed, the pattern is strengthened for pairs of countries with high levels of initial
trade, further corroborating this interpretation.
Yet, our results do not suggest that business-supported regimes are less belligerent in
all situations. In fact, the probability of initiating militarized interstate conflict is higher
for business-supported regimes when only considering target countries where regimes are
not supported by business elites. This result, we suggest, is more in line with traditional
Marxist “imperialist” theories, such as the one proposed by Lenin, suggesting that business
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elites may encourage leaders to go to war in order to “open up” markets and thus allow their
firms to reap additional profits. In sum, whether empowered business elites are a force for
peace or conflict depends on the nature of the conflict, and more specifically the anticipated
economic consequences of the conflict in question.
Our findings come with limitations that raise several questions for future research. First,
our claims are based on correlational evidence, and can only support a tentative causal
interpretation of the role of business elites in driving conflict. Future work, employing alter-
native designs and types of data, must be done to shore up a causal explanation. Second,
future work may conduct a broader investigation into how the preferences of business elites
translate into foreign policy outcomes, more generally, including outcomes such as trade, in-
ternational cooperation, and diplomatic behavior. Third, we restricted our focus to business
elites. Yet, our theoretical framework is general and can be extended to other groups, such
as military elites, party elites, urban middle classes, or industrial workers, that may enter
regime support coalition and have very different gains and costs from interstate conflicts.
Importantly, the new V-Dem data on support coalitions allow researchers to test arguments
and hypothesis concerning these alternative groups in a similar manner to what we have
done here for business elites. Hence, our study provides a template for explicitly modeling
and testing how variations in the social profile of regime support coalitions influence inter-
national conflict behavior, and potentially also behavior in other domains of international
relations.
29
References
Anderton, Charles H. and John R. Carter. 2001. “The Impact of War on Trade: An Inter-
rupted Times-Series Study.” Journal of Peace Research 38(4):445–457.
Angell, Norman. 1938. The Great Illusion – Now. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk and Brian Pollins. 2009. “Trading Data: Evaluating
our Assumptions and Coding Rules.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(5):471–
491.
Baum, Matthew A and Philip BK Potter. 2015. War and democratic constraint: How the
public influences foreign policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 2001. “Throwing out the Baby with the Bath Water:
A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon.” International Organization 55(2):187–195.
Bolt, J. and J. L. van Zanden. 2013. “The First Update of the Maddison Project; Re-
Estimating Growth Before 1820.” Maddison Project Working Paper 4. .
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2019. Only the dead: the persistence of war in the modern age. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2012. “Domestic Explanations of Interna-
tional Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 15:161–181.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alistair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow.
2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith.
1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science
Review 93(4):791–807.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith.
2004. “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War.” World Politics
56(3):363–368.
Choi, Seung-Whan. 2010. “Legislative constraints: A path to peace?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 54(3):438–470.
30
Clark, Christopher. 2012. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. London:
Allen Lane.
Colgan, Jeff D. and Jessica L.P. Weeks. 2015. “Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and
International Conflict.” International Organization 69(1):163194.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Adam Glynn, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg,
Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jan Teorell. 2020. Varieties
of Democracy: Measuring Two Centuries of Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell,
David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven M. Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna
Lu¨hrmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel
Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Lisa Gastaldi,
Haakon Gjerlow, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj
Medzihorsky, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Romer, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundstrom,
Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. “V-Dem Country-Year
Dataset v.9.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Jan Teorell,
Kyle L Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von
Ro¨mer et al. 2019. “V-dem methodology v9.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Debs, Alexandre and Nuno P Monteiro. 2014. “Known unknowns: Power shifts, uncertainty,
and war.” International Organization 68(1):1–31.
Djuve, Vilde Lunnan, Carl Henrik Knutsen and Tore Wig. 2020. “Patterns of Regime
Breakdown since the French Revolution.” Comparative Political Studies 53(6):923–958.
Dunning, John H. 1993. Multinational enterprises and the global economy. Workingham:
Addison Wesley.
Farcau, Bruce W. 2000. The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the
Pacific, 1879-1884. Praeger.
Fariss, Christopher J, Charles D Crabtree, Therese Anders, Zachary M Jones, Fridolin J Lin-
der and Jonathan N Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and
Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.01099 .
31
Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88(3):577–592.
Feenstra, Robert C. 2003. Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Findlay, Ronald and Kevin H. O’Rourke. 2007. Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the
World Economy in the Second Millennium. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fischer, Fritz. 1967. Germany’s aims in the First World War. New York: WW Norton.
Galtung, Johan. 1971. “A Structural Theory of Imperialism.” Journal of Peace Research
8(2):81–117.
Gartzke, Erik. 1999. “War is in the error term.” International Organization 53(3):597–587.
Gartzke, Erik. 2007. “The Capitalist Peace.” American Journal of Political Science
51(1):166–191.
Gartzke, Erik, Timothy Nordstrom and Charles Boehmer. 2011. “Disaggregating Interna-
tional Organizations.” Typescript, University of California, San Diego.
URL: http://147.142.190.246/joomla/peio/files2011/papers/Gartzke,%20Nordstrom,%20Boehmer%2003.10.2010.pdf
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime
Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12(2):313–331.
Goertz, Gary. 2006. Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Goldsmith, Benjamin E., Dimitri Semenovich, Arcot Sowmya and Gorana Grgic. 2017. “Po-
litical Competition and the Initiation of International Conflict: A New Perspective on the
Institutional Foundations of Democratic Peace.” World Politics 69(3):493531.
Gowa, Joanne and Raymond Hicks. 2017. “Commerce and Conflict: New Data about the
Great War.” British Journal of Political Science 47(3):653–674.
Greenberg, Michael. 1969. British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hegre, H˚avard. 2014. “Democracy and armed conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 51(2):159–
172.
32
Hegre, H˚avard, Michael Bernhard and Jan Teorell. 2020. “Civil society and the democratic
peace.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(1):32–62.
Hilferding, Rudolf. 1985. Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Devel-
opment. London: Routledge.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 2010a. Age of Capital: 1848-1875. London: Hachette UK.
Hobsbawm, Eric. 2010b. Age of Empire: 1875-1914. London: Hachette UK.
Hobson, John Atkinson. 1902. Imperialism: a study. J. Pott.
Hyde, Susan D and Elizabeth N Saunders. 2020. “Recapturing Regime Type in Interna-
tional Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space.” International Organization
74(2):363–395.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell, John Gerring, Haakon Gjerløw, Svend-
Erik Skaaning, Tore Wig, Daniel Ziblatt, Kyle Marquardt, Dan Pemstein and Brigitte
Seim. 2019. “Introducing the Historical Varieties of Democracy Dataset: Patterns and
Determinants of Democratization in the Long 19th Century.” Journal of Peace Research
56(3):440–451.
Lenin, Vladimir. 1999. Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. London: Resistance
books.
Lensink, Robert, Niels Hermes and Victor Murinde. 2000. “Capital flight and political risk.”
Journal of International Money and Finance 19(1):73–92.
Levy, Jack S and William R Thompson. 2011. Causes of war. John Wiley & Sons.
Lipson, Charles. 1985. Standing Guard. Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Luxemburg, Rosa. 1913. The accumulation of capital. London: Routledge.
Manchester, William. 2017. The arms of Krupp: The rise and fall of the industrial dynasty
that armed Germany at war. Boston: Little, Brown.
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant
in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
33
Mousseau, Michael. 2013. “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy.” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 57(1):186–197.
Oster, Emily. 2019. “Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence.”
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 37(2):187–204.
Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Joshua Krusell and
Farhad Miri. 2018. “The V-Dem measurement model: latent variable analysis for cross-
national and cross-temporal expert-coded data.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Reiter, Dan and Allan C Stam. 2003. “Identifying the culprit: Democracy, dictatorship, and
dispute initiation.” American Political Science Review 97(2):333–337.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist
Development and Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence,
and international organizations. London, New York: W.W. Norton.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1816 – 2007. New York:
CQ Press.
Scheidel, Walter. 2018. The Great Leveler. Violence and the Global History of Inequality
from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Schneider, Gerald. 2017. “Capitalist Peace Theory: A Critical Appraisal.” Oxford: Oxford
Research Encyclopedias (Politics).
URL: http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-314
Schneider, Gerald and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2010. “The Capitalist Peace: The Origins and
Prospects of a Liberal Idea.” International Interactions 36(2):107–114.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1955/1919. Imperialism and Social Classes. Cleveland: World Pub-
lishing.
Signorino, Curtis S and Jeffrey M Ritter. 1999. “Tau-b or not tau-b: Measuring the similarity
of foreign policy positions.” International Studies Quarterly 43(1):115–144.
34
Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
verisity Press.
Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning and Staffan I Lindberg. 2019. “Mea-
suring Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900–2017.” Studies in Comparative International
Development 54:71–95.
Varian, Hal R. 1992. Microeconomic Theory. New York: W.W. Norton.
Vidal, Gore. 2007. Dreaming War: Blood for Oil and the Cheney-Bush Junta. New York:
Bold Type Books.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. “Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve.”
International Organization 62(1):35–64.
Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initi-
ation of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 106(2):326–347.
Weeks, Jessica L.P. 2014. Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wong, John Y. 2000. “The limits of naval power: British gunboat diplomacy in China from
the Nemesis to the Amethyst, 1839–1949.” War & Society 18(2):93–120.
35
A Online Appendices
This online appendix contains sevens sections where we present descriptive statistics or report
results from several additional tests mentioned, but not reported in tables, in the main paper.
First, we present descriptive statistics on our key variables. Second, we report the results
from specifications including dyad-fixed effects. Third, we perform the same estimation and
plot of split-sample results as we did in Figures 6 and 7 for total trade in the main text,
but using exports and imports to split the sample. Fourth, we take out all observations
relating to WWII and WWI from our data and re-estimate our benchmark specifications.
Fifth, we estimate split-sample models on democracies and dictatorships, splitting the sample
according to regime in the initiating country. Sixth, we investigate results for different
combinations of major-minor power status in the initiator and target countries. Finally, we
replicate our benchmark models, but by using different ways of operationalizing the presence
or importance of business elites in the support coalition, using the continuous measure of
support coalition presence as well as V-Dem’s ‘most important support group’ coding.
i
A.1 Descriptive statistics
(Summary stats for variables in the baseline model)
count mean sd min max
MID initiation 1374616 .0018274 .0427093 0 1
Business elites 1229440 .4015641 .4902148 0 1
Business elites (dyad) 1099284 .1651893 .3713515 0 1
Polyarchy (dyad) 1351538 .2371735 .2002768 .008 .92
Num. groups in coalition 1374616 9.373664 3.2117 0 13.33333
Support group size 1224821 .4956682 1.163256 -2.912 2.6
GDP 1364085 9.851099 1.958225 4.9662 16.13932
Population 1364085 8.867382 1.637406 4.137793 14.09482
CINC 1374616 .0097898 .0297037 3.00e-06 .383864
Contiguity 1374616 5.32388 1.82822 0 6
L(distance) 1374616 7.72548 3.005801 -9.21034 9.421168
Peace years 1374616 20.63843 24.13418 -9 185
Peace years2 1374616 1008.403 2383.814 0 34225
Peace years3 1374616 70705.37 301706.9 -729 6331625
ii
A.2 Models with dyad-fixed effects
Table A.1: Dyad-fixed effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
m1 m2 m3 m4
Business elites i -0.0480 -0.000285 0.488 -0.000698
(-0.49) (-1.53) (0.33) (-0.25)
Business elites i 0.0986 0.000156 3.694* 0.00809**
(0.98) (0.84) (2.43) (2.94)
Business elites (dyad) -0.480*** -0.000859*** -92.80*** -0.237***
(-3.70) (-3.59) (-4.08) (-5.14)
N 55739 1037428 55916 1049278
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T and Z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on dyads. All
models include the covariates in table 1 model 2 (excluded from table).
iii
A.3 Separating between exports and imports
This section replicates our benchmark model on samples split by whether the initiating state
is a high or low (above or below median) exporter to the target state, and samples split in
the same way by imports. Figure A.1 and figure A.2 displays results for exports and figure
A.3 and A.4 for imports. These plots reveal that the relationship between business elites in
i increases the risk of conflict-initiation against non-business elite regimes when i is a high
exporter to j, but not otherwise (A.1. The pacifying effect of business-business dyads does
not seem to depend on high export dyads (A2).
Second, the plots for imports indicate that business elites increase conflict initiation
(against non-business regimes) when the initiator has high imports from the target. Figure
A.4 shows that business-business pairings are pacifying when imports are high but not when
they are low. This is in line with our expectation that business elites conduce peaceful
relations with trading partners that also have business oriented policies.
Figure A.1: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi when Business elitesj= 0, in high-
(left) or low (right) exports from the initating state
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Figure A.2: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi when Business elitesj= 1, in high-
(left) or low (right) exports from the initating state
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Figure A.3: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi when Business elitesj= 0, in high-
(left) or low (right) imports to the initating state
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Figure A.4: Predicted probabilities for Business elitesi when Business elitesj= 1, in high-
(left) or low (right) imports to the initating state
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A.4 WWI and WWII
We estimate models where we remove WWI and WWII from the sample. We do this in a
rather blunt way by simply removing all years where WWI and WWII occured (1914-1918
and 1939-1945), since it would be problematic to count and treat conflict codings in these
(conflict-rich) periods as unrelated. Our findings are very similar to the main results in these
models as well.
Table A.2: Baseline models excluding WWI and WWII
Logit Logit Logit LPM
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Business elites i 0.587*** 0.706*** -0.0398 -0.000244
(3.69) (3.90) (-0.28) (-0.97)
Business elites j 0.785*** 0.873*** 0.311* 0.000664**
(4.86) (4.63) (2.10) (2.63)
Business elites (dyad) -0.823** -0.790** -0.629** -0.00144***
(-3.03) (-2.98) (-3.27) (-3.86)
N 1069172 1027358 46932 1027358
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T and Z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on dyads.
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A.5 Democracy and non-democracy initiators
Table A.3: Benchmark models replicated on democracy and non-democracy initiators
Logit Logit Logit LPM Logit Logit Logit LPM
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Democratic i Democratic i Democratic i Democratic i Autocratic i Autocratic i Autocratic i Autocratic i
Business elites i 0.664** 0.453* -0.122 0.000125 0.220 0.399 -0.534* -0.00122**
(3.23) (2.12) (-0.52) (0.33) (1.04) (1.59) (-2.21) (-2.64)
Business elites j 0.300 0.189 -0.573 -0.000966* 0.733*** 0.968*** 0.422* 0.00129***
(1.12) (0.62) (-1.79) (-2.41) (4.87) (5.35) (2.21) (3.37)
Business elites (dyad) -0.717 -0.696 -0.177 -0.00155** -0.471 -0.560 -0.591* -0.00143*
(-1.91) (-1.83) (-0.51) (-2.80) (-1.39) (-1.69) (-1.97) (-2.22)
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X
Region-dummies X X X X X X
Decade-dummies X X X X X X X X
Dyad-FE X X X
N 550161 527620 20076 527620 541209 520866 25575 520866
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T and Z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Joint
democracy and non-democracy defined by taking the median joint-democracy score as the cutoff, which is a polyarchy score
of .20
viii
A.6 Major power status
We replicate our benchmark for different combinations of major-minor power status in the
dyad in table A.4 below. This shows that the link between business-elites in the initiating
country’s support coalition (when the target does not have a business-elite coalition) and
conflict exists for major powers, as initiators but not minor ones. As discussed in the paper,
this suggests that business elites can drive conflict mainly when they carry political clout
in powerful states. The dyadic finding also seems to be most robust for dyads where both
countries are major powers.
Table A.4: Benchmark models replicated on different constellations of major vs. minor
powers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power status Major-major Major-minor Minor-major Minor-minor
Business elites i 0.965** 1.108*** -0.194 -0.217
(3.19) (4.57) (-0.52) (-1.21)
Business elites j 0.322 0.165 1.479*** 0.289
(1.16) (0.57) (4.54) (1.69)
Business elites (dyad) -0.869* -0.462 -0.398 -0.296
(-2.27) (-1.37) (-0.83) (-0.86)
Region-FE X X X X
Decade-FE X X X X
N 3548 53712 50022 981092
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T and Z statistics in parentheses. Major power status comes from the
Correlates of War Dataset.
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A.7 Different measures of business elites in support coalitions
In this section, we replicate our main analyses, but trying out different ways of measuring the
presence or importance of business-elites in support coalitions. Columns 1-2 use the original,
continuous V-Dem measure, where the presence of business-elites are coded by averaging
country experts scores. The scale ranges from 0 to 1. To illustrate, a 1-score now indicates
full consensus among experts on the presence of business elites in the support coalition,
0 indicates full consensus on their absence, and a score of 0.5 indicates that exactly half
of the country experts coded business elites as part of the support coalition for a regime,
in a particular year. These models yield similar estimates to our main results. Next, in
Columns 3-4, we use the measure capturing whether business elites constitute the “most
important” support group, as coded by V-Dem experts, where “most important” indicates
that the support of this group is most pertinent for the regime’s ability to stay in power. This
measure has much less variation over time than the measures registering presence of a group
in the support coalition. Forn many observations, the military are consistently coded as the
“most important”, and this is especially the case for non-democracies. It is therefore not
unsurprising that the precision of our estimated coefficients is weakened. Results generally
point in the same direction, but the interactive coefficients fall short of statistical significance
at conventional levels. Finally, we use the stricter measure of business elite presence in the
support coalition, requiring consensus among V-Dem expert coders on their presence for
coding a regime as “business-supported”. Once again, results are very clear for the monadic
expectation – business-supported regimes are more likely to initiate conflicts – whereas the
dyadic pacifying effect is less precisely estimated, with the interactive coefficients obtaining
t-values around 1.5.
x
Table A.5: Baseline models replicated with two different measures of business elite presence
Logit
Measure Sliding scale Most important group (binary) Threshold == 1
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Business elites i 0.624*** 0.753*** 0.492*** 0.525*** 0.447*** 0.557***
(4.17) (4.40) (4.16) (4.07) (3.78) (4.23)
Business elites j 0.760*** 0.842*** -0.213 -0.180 0.569*** 0.658***
(4.96) (4.72) (-1.28) (-1.06) (4.30) (4.26)
Business elites (dyad) -0.891*** -0.858*** -1.025 -0.918 -0.295 -0.291
(-3.39) (-3.36) (-1.53) (-1.36) (-1.59) (-1.53)
N 1092232 1049278 1107288 1061268 1092232 1049278
Baseline controls X X X X X X
Region-dummies X X X X X X
Decade-dummies X X X X X X
N 1092232 1049278 1107288 1061268 1092232 1049278
z scores in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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